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gnu: openssh: Adapt for root-less guix store.
Fixes <https://issues.guix.gnu.org/78067>. Previously sshd would use /gnu/store/…-openssh-…/var/empty as its PRIVSEP_PATH. However, when using the unprivileged daemon, that directory would belong to guix-daemon:guix-daemon, leading to this error: sshd[234]: fatal: /gnu/store/…-openssh-10.0p1/var/empty must be owned by root and not group or world-writable. Fix that by switching to /var/empty. * gnu/packages/patches/openssh-trust-guix-store-directory.patch (openssh): Adjust to trust files in guix store owned by guix-daemon. * gnu/packages/ssh.scm (openssh)[arguments]: Remove ‘reset-/var/empty’ phase; change ‘install’ phase to not create PRIVSEP_PATH.. Append ending slash when substituting STORE_DIRECTORY. Change-Id: I3bd01f8b9d6406e3b886eea8f4b8c265a51cc72f Reported-by: Zack Weinberg <zack@owlfolio.org> Signed-off-by: Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>
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committed by
Ludovic Courtès
parent
d9e0bb44c0
commit
eab097c682
@@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ From: Alexey Abramov <levenson@mmer.org>
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Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 11:32:15 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Trust guix store directory
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To be able to execute binaries defined in OpenSSH configuration, we
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need to tell OpenSSH that we can trust Guix store objects. safe_path
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procedure takes a canonical path and for each component, walking
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upwards, checks ownership and permissions constrains which are: must
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be owned by root, not writable by group or others.
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To be able to execute binaries defined in OpenSSH configuration, we need to
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tell OpenSSH that we can trust Guix store objects. safe_path procedure is
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patched to assume files in Guix store to be safe. Additionally configuration
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file placed in Guix store is assumed to be safe to load.
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---
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misc.c | 5 +++++
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
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misc.c | 6 ++++++
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readconf.c | 7 ++++---
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2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
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index 0134d69..7131d5e 100644
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index dd0bd032a..6b866464c 100644
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--- a/misc.c
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+++ b/misc.c
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@@ -2146,6 +2146,7 @@ int
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@@ -2254,6 +2254,7 @@ int
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safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
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uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
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{
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@@ -24,17 +24,42 @@ index 0134d69..7131d5e 100644
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char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
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char *cp;
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int comparehome = 0;
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@@ -2178,6 +2179,10 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
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}
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strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
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+ /* If we are past the Guix store then we can stop */
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+ if (strcmp(guix_store, buf) == 0)
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+ break;
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@@ -2271,6 +2272,11 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
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snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
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return -1;
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}
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+ // the file is trusted when it is located in guix store
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+ if (strncmp(buf, guix_store, strlen(guix_store)) == 0) {
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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if (stat(buf, &st) == -1 ||
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(!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
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(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
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if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
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(stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
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snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
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diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
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index 7cbe7d2c2..40a5f1ace 100644
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--- a/readconf.c
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+++ b/readconf.c
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@@ -2566,6 +2566,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
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{
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FILE *f;
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char *line = NULL;
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+ char errmsg[512];
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size_t linesize = 0;
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int linenum;
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int bad_options = 0;
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@@ -2581,9 +2582,9 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
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if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
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fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
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- if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
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- (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
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- fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
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+ if (safe_path(filename, &sb, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
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+ fatal(errmsg);
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+ }
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}
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debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename);
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--
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2.34.0
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2.49.0
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@@ -275,16 +275,11 @@ a server that supports the SSH-2 protocol.")
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'()))
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#:phases
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#~(modify-phases %standard-phases
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(add-after 'configure 'reset-/var/empty
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(lambda _
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(substitute* "Makefile"
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(("PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty")
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(string-append "PRIVSEP_PATH=" #$output "/var/empty")))))
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(add-after 'configure 'set-store-location
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(lambda _
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(substitute* "misc.c"
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(("@STORE_DIRECTORY@")
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(string-append "\"" (%store-directory) "\"")))))
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(string-append "\"" (%store-directory) "/\"")))))
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(add-before 'check 'patch-tests
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(lambda _
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(substitute* "regress/test-exec.sh"
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@@ -297,9 +292,10 @@ a server that supports the SSH-2 protocol.")
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(string-append pre post)))))
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(replace 'install
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(lambda* (#:key (make-flags '()) #:allow-other-keys)
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;; Install without host keys and system configuration files. This
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;; will install /var/empty to the store, which is needed by the
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;; system openssh-service-type.
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;; Don't create /var/empty.
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(substitute* "Makefile"
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((".*MKDIR_P.*PRIVSEP_PATH.*") ""))
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;; Install without host keys and system configuration files.
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(apply invoke "make" "install-nosysconf" make-flags)
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(with-directory-excursion "contrib"
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(chmod "ssh-copy-id" #o555)
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